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Local telephone companies have long been regulated as natural mono-
polies. However, technological innovation and the prospect offalling regulatory
barriers to entry now expose some portions of the local exchange to
competition from cable television systems, wireless telephony, and rival wireline
systems. Nevertheless, it is probable that certain parts of local telephony will
remain naturally monopolistic. In these cases the local exchange carrier must
be permitted to sell necessary inputs to its competitors in the market for final
telecommunications products at a price that reflects all its costs, including
opportunity costs. The authors' analysis applies to any network industry. Thus,
it is useful in antitrust analysis of essential facilities and in regulatory analysis
of transportation, energy transmission, pipelines, and mail delivery.
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Introduction
One of the most vexing issues facing regulators of local telephone service
is the pricing of access to the local loop. The pricing is particularly difficult
because a local exchange carrier (LEC) supplies access to interexchange carriers
(IXCs) while simultaneously competing with them in toll services within a local
access and transport area (LATA).' Access has two significant attributes. First,
access is an intermediate good; it is an input used in the supply of a final
product, intraLATA toll service. Second, the LEC produces this input for use
1. For a discussion of how LATAs were created as local telephone markets by the Modification of Final
Judgment (MFJ), see MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 227-34 (1992).
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not only by itself, but also by its rivals in the market for the final product.
Pricing issues arise generically whenever a firm, X, is the only supplier of an
input used both by itself and by a rival to provide some final product. If X
charges its rival more for the input than it implicitly charges itself, it will have
handicapped that rival's ability to compete with X, perhaps seriously. The
reverse will be true if regulation forces X to charge the rival less for the input
than X charges itself. This pricing problem arises not only in telecommunica-
tions regulation, but also in antitrust law2 and in the regulation of any network
industry.
This intermediate-goods pricing problem can distort the efficient division
of responsibilities between the LEC and the IXCs in supplying competitive tele-
communications services. An excessive price for access handicaps the IXCs in
their efforts to attract a share of intraLATA service. Correspondingly, below-
cost access prices handicap the LEC. Either price distortion can direct some
of the business in question to an inefficient supplier. This kind of inefficiency
can also be expressed in terms of the profits the LEC earns by supplying access
to itself and by supplying it to the IXCs. If the LEC charges the IXCs so high
a price that any sale yields a large incremental profit, but the LEC forgoes some
of this profit when it uses access in its own sale of intraLATA toll services,
then the LEC will have set an indefensibly low price for its final product. This
constitutes a competitive impediment for the IXCs. Thus, the problem is to
ensure an appropriate relationship between the profits the LEC earns from
providing access to itself and those it earns from selling access to its com-
petitors in the final-product market.
What is the proper relation between these two profit figures? The
unambiguous answer we propose may appear unfamiliar and invented especially
to address the pricing of intermediate inputs such as access. On the contrary,
the efficient component-pricing rule that we will describe is simply another use
of the incremental-cost principles that achieve economic efficiency. The role
of opportunity cost is given special emphasis because of its relevance to the
current issue.
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the trend toward competition in local
telephony. Part II defines the relevant cost concepts necessary for analyzing
optimal input pricing. Part Ill derives and explains the efficient com-
ponent-pricing rule. Part IV discusses the relevance of the efficient
component-pricing rule to specific issues posed by the emergence of
competition in local telephony, giving special attention to the regulatory
response to such competition in New Zealand.
2. This is the essential facilities problem. See United States v. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
MCI Comm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
891 (1983).
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I. Toward Competition in Local Telephony
There is no question that substantial competition pervades some activities
of the local telephone companies. In other portions of their operations
competition is weak or virtually nonexistent, although changes on the horizon
suggest that it may not be absent for long. But even in the competitive portions
of the LECs' operations, it is probably undesirable to let the LECs fend for
themselves, because the LECs' monopoly services constitute inputs for the
activities of their rivals in competitive arenas-inputs without which the rivals
cannot hope to operate. The LECs' monopoly services are referred to as
"bottlenecks" or "essential facilities." This means that, absent regulatory
constraint, the LEC could use the monopoly services or facilities to force rivals
to bend to its will or to destroy those rivals altogether. This is the fundamental
complicating phenomenon hindering the deregulation of local telephone service.
Soon after the Modification of Final Judgment, it became apparent that
competition would exist between the LECs and interexchange carriers such as
AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. Yet, the extent to which competition between these
two groups has grown was not widely foreseen.3 The primary arena in which
that competition has occurred is the transmission of messages within the
LATAs. Intrastate telecommunications service does not fall under the direct
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and state
regulatory agencies have not prevented the LECs from providing intraLATA
long-distance services. With both LECs and IXCs participating in the lucrative
intraLATA intrastate market, both groups pursued business in this arena with
vigor. Competition in the local arena is now provided or threatened from a
bewildering array of sources: the IXCs, overlapping LECs, resellers, cable
television firms, private bypass arrangements, cellular telephone and other
wireless services, and local fiber-optic networks.
Probably the most breathtaking development in this regard was the
announcement in October 1993 that Bell Atlantic, one of the seven regional
Bell operating companies (RBOCs), would acquire the largest cable company
in the United States, Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI)-a deal which later
collapsed in February 1994.4 Although many viewed this move as primarily
a way for Bell Atlantic to enter the cable television market on a grand scale,
the merger could have had even more significant implications, for it would have
quickly placed Bell Atlantic in direct competition with other RBOCs for local
3. For an illuminating contemporary analysis of AT&T's possible strategic objectives in settling the
divestiture suit and consenting to the MFJ, see Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing:
The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, I YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983).
4. See Dennis Kneale, Bell Atlantic and TCI Are Poised to Shape a New Interactive World, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 14, 1993, at A l; Bell Atlantic's Pact to Acquire TCI Collapses Amid Dispute Over Price; Cable
Rate Cut by FCC Was Final Straw. WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, .1994, at A3.
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residential telephone access in scores of American cities outside Bell Atlantic's
current telephone service area.
The experience of intraLATA competition is instructive for policy-makers
concerned with local service competition. In that market the growth of
competition posed a disturbing dilemma. The LECs argued that complete
regulation as monopoly suppliers made it impossible for them to compete
effectively. That is not to say that the IXCs were left free to compete without
constraint. AT&T, in particular, continued to face regulatory intervention both
by the FCC and by state public utility commissions. Nevertheless, in intrastate
services, the LECs claimed that deregulation of their activities was trailing that
of AT&T, presumably because the LECs were the residual proprietors of all
the substantive bottleneck services.
The LECs do continue to possess bottleneck services, even though
competition threatens to erode or even to eliminate them. The bottlenecks
constitute legitimate grounds to continue regulating the LECs. The primary
bottleneck is the LECs' control of the facilities used to supply access
service-that is, the service that provides the connection between messages
received from outside areas and the local loop to which a particular subscriber
is attached. For local service, at least until recently, it generally has been
deemed wasteful to include two or more rival suppliers, since that would entail
duplication of facilities (the wires leading into the individual residence or
business location). Moreover, it was judged that in this field a multiplicity of
suppliers could not long survive, given the cost that their presence imposes and
the probable inconvenience to subscribers. As a result, operation of the local
loop and the provision of access to it were considered to constitute a natural
monopoly from which no substantial deviation was possible.- The switches and
other equipment used in providing access then were considered to be a
bottleneck facility, because no IXC could deliver a message to the intended
recipient's telephone through the local loop without purchasing the access
service from the local exchange carrier.
That this transaction constitutes sale of a service by a monopolist to a set
of purchasers who compete with one another was complication enough. This
state of affairs calls for the usual restraints upon the monopoly seller to ensure
that it does not exploit its customers. The situation was rendered even more
complex by the competition between the LECs and the IXCs for intraLATA
service to subscribers. Consequently, an LEC unconstrained by regulation is
5. Some have argued that a market structure of overlapping LECs, which existed in many American
cities until roughly 1915, could or would have survived if interconnection between competing LECs had
been required, if AT&T had been prevented from acquiring competitors, and if exclusive franchises had
not become politically expedient. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12-17. For an analysis of the effect
of political constraints on this early market structure, see William P. Barnett & Glenn R. Carroll, How
Institutional Constraints Affected the Organization of Early U.S. Telephony, 9 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 98
(1993).
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in a position not only to favor one IXC over another, but more importantly to
supply access to itself on terms that favor its own competitive position in the
intraLATA markets. The solution to this problem requires carefully designed
rules on the pricing of intermediate inputs such as access, at least until effective
competition in access services becomes established.
11. Relevant Cost Concepts
In order to explain the efficient component-pricing rule, it is first necessary
to clarify the meaning of several different cost concepts. These cost concepts
are relevant to what we call the competitive-market model of regulation, which
seeks to simulate the outcomes of a perfectly contestable market.
A. Marginal Cost of X
The marginal cost of X refers to the increase in the firm's total outlays
resulting from a small rise in the output of X. As already noted, in perfectly
competitive equilibrium the firm will always set the price of X equal to the
marginal cost of X. This price will satisfy the requirements of economic
efficiency if it yields revenue sufficient for continued financial solvency of the
firm. But such a price will always prevent the earning of revenues sufficient
for this purpose where production is characterized by scale economies.
B. Incremental Cost of X
Incremental cost is a generic concept referring to the addition, per unit of
the additional output in question, to the firm's total cost when the output of X
expands by some preselected increment. Thus, marginal cost can be
approximated by incremental cost if the increment in question is small. But if
the increment is large, marginal cost and incremental cost can differ
substantially, because the ranges of outputs examined in the two calculations
are not the same.
C. Average-Incremental Cost for an Entire Service X (AICx)
Average-incremental cost, along with marginal cost, is the concept most
frequently cited in recent discussions of public-interest floors on prices. The
average-incremental cost of the entire service is defined as the difference in the
firm's total costs with and without service X supplied, divided by the output
of X. In other words, it is the cost per unit of X that is added to the firm's total
outlays as a result of its supply of the current output of X. Formally, if x,y,z,....
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represent the outputs of the firm's various products, and TC(xy,z,..) is the total
amount the firm must expend in producing that combination of outputs, then
AIC, = [TC(xy,z,...) - TC(O,y,z,.. .)]/x.
It is natural to consider average-incremental cost as a first cousin of the
commonly used average-variable cost. Because, so far as we are aware, there
is no standard definition of the latter, the differences and similarities between
the two concepts cannot be conclusively determined. They can be used to mean
the same thing, but there are at least three differences in the ways they are often
interpreted or utilized. First, average-variable cost is used at least sometimes
to refer to short-run cost, with capacity not adjusted to output volume.
Average-incremental cost, on the other hand, is the lower, long-run figure
obtained after plant and equipment are adjusted so as to minimize the average
cost of the pertinent output. Second, average-incremental cost of a service X
includes any fixed cost that must be incurred on behalf of that product alone.
Professor Phillip Areeda, Langdell Professor of Law at Harvard University, has
indicated that his definition of average-variable cost, which is used extensively
in antitrust litigation,' does include such product-specific fixed costs.7 But it
is not clear that everyone who calculates average-variable cost figures performs
a similar calculation. Finally, average-variable cost calculations are burdened
by the baggage of past calculation practices of questionable legitimacy;
average-incremental cost studies so far appear to be less burdened by these
practices. Despite these possible distinctions, readers will lose little in following
the logic in the remainder of our discussion if they treat average-incremental
cost and average-variable cost as synonyms.
D. Stand-Alone Cost of a Combination of Services Y,Z.... (SACr 2 )
The stand-alone cost of a combination of services is the cost that would
be incurred by an efficient entrant to the industry in question if it were to
decide to produce only some specified set of commodities YZ ..... That is, it is
the cost to produce just those items, standing alone. The concept also applies
to an entrant that decides to produce only a single commodity Y. Using the
preceding notation, we can write, for the case where the entrant decides to
produce Y,Z .... but not X,
SACyz = TC(Oy,z,.,.).
6. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); see WILLIAM 1. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: APPLICATIONS
AND THEORY (1986) (defining average-variable costs).
7. See BAUMOL, supra note 6, at 116 n.4, 118 n.6 (1986).
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Under the competitive-market standard for regulation, marginal costs and
average-incremental costs are the figures relevant for price floors, while
stand-alone costs are the figures relevant for price ceilings. Moreover, as we
show elsewhere, incremental cost and stand-alone cost are intimately connected,
and either number can be deduced directly from the other.' Specifically, when
the firm earns no more and no less than the competitive rate of return, if each
of the firm's prices is above its average-incremental cost, then each of those
prices must be below its stand-alone cost, and vice versa. This result can
simplify the administration of price floors and ceilings.
1Ii. The Efficient Component-Pricing Rule
A critical requirement for economic efficiency is that the price of any
product be no lower than that product's marginal cost or its average-incremental
cost. Economic analysis emphasizes that the pertinent marginal cost as well as
the average-incremental cost must include all opportunity costs incurred by the
supplier in providing the product. Opportunity cost refers to all potential
earnings that the supplying firm forgoes, either by providing inputs of its own
rather than purchasing them, or by offering services to competitors that force
it to relinquish business to those rivals, and thus to forgo the profits on that lost
business. In a competitive market, price always includes compensation for
opportunity costs, such as the interest forgone by the firm when it supplies
funds from retained earnings rather than borrowing them from a bank. The
efficient component-pricing rule states simply that the price of an input should
equal its average-incremental cost, including all pertinent incremental oppor-
tunity costs. That is,
optimal input price = the input's direct per-unit incremental cost +
the opportunity cost to the input supplier of
the sale of a unit of input.
We examine now the logic and consequences of that rule. In the following
discussion, the term "direct costs" will refer to all costs that, from the point of
view of the supplier firm, are not opportunity costs.
A. The Nature of the Problem
The literature on the economics of price regulation indicates that the
pricing principle just described can guide the choice of efficient access charges.
9. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 92-95
(1994).
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This pricing principle-variously known as the efficient component-pricing rule,
the imputation requirement, the principle of competitive equality, or the parity
principle-is merely a variant of the elementary principles for efficiency in
pricing that were discussed above. This rule applies to the sale of an input-a
component K of the final product-by a supplier X of both the component and
the final product. The purchasing firm Y uses the component to produce the
same final product as X and sells that final product in competition with X. Here,
Y is itself assumed to make the remaining components (other than K) of the
final product. If X sells component K to Y, then Y is enabled to compete with
X in selling the final, product. When X sells component K to Y, either
voluntarily or pursuant to regulatory mandate, what price should X charge for
component K?
We will use an example from rail transportation, rather than telecommuni-
cations, to answer this pricing question. In our experience, the logic of the issue
seems to be grasped more easily with the aid of the rail analogy. As will be
shown, however, regulators already have applied this logic to telecommunica-
tions markets. Consider then two railroads, X and Y, that operate along parallel
routes from an intermediate point B to a destination point C, as illustrated in
Figure 1. Railroad X owns the only tracks extending from the origin point A
to the intermediate point B. In this case, the final product is transportation all
the way from A to C. Competing railroad Y, also a proprietor of tracks from
B to C, can be expected in these circumstances to apply to railroad X for
interconnection from A to B, seeking to rent trackage rights along that route
from its rival. If the transaction is completed, Y (like X) will be able to ship
all the way from A to C; in regulatory parlance, X then is called the landlord
railroad and Y is called the tenant. Regulators commonly have been requested
by prospective tenants to force a landlord to grant them trackage rights. For
obvious reasons, the regulatory agency usually has been asked to set the rental
fee as well.
The sale of access by an LEC to an IXC that is a horizontal competitor
of the LEC in the market for intraLATA toll services is precisely analogous
to the grant of trackage rights by the landlord to the tenant railroad. Access is
an input to the final product, interexchange telecommunication, and is not
essentially different from the purchase of any other intermediate input. Setting
a price for access to the local loop in telecommunications is, therefore, precisely
analogous to setting the rental fee for trackage rights. More generally, the
pricing of access is analogous to pricing any product component in comparable
circumstances.





The Trackage-Rights Pricing Problem
The efficient component-pricing rule has already advanced from theory to
practice in the United States and abroad. The Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) has applied the rule in several railroad rate cases.9 In October 1989, the
California Public Utilities Commission embraced the rule in its reform of
regulation of LECs.' ° More recently, the High Court of New Zealand
adopted-and the Court of Appeal of New Zealand subsequently rejected-the
rule in antitrust litigation between Clear Communication, Ltd. and the former
government telephone monopoly, Telecom Corporation of New Zealand, Ltd."'
B. The Traditional Regulatory Approach to Rental Fee Determination
9. For example, see the quartet of cases known as Compensation I through IV, St. Louis S.W.
Ry.-Trackage Rights over Missouri Pac. R.R.-Kansas City to St. Louis, I I.C.C.2d 776 (1994), 4 I.C.C.2d
668 (1987), 5 I.C.C.2d 525 (1989), 9 I.C.C.2d 80 (1991).
10. Alternative Regulatory Framework for Local Exchange Carriers, Invest. No. 87-11-033, 33
C.P.U.C.2d 43, 107 P.U.R.4th 1 (1989).
1I. Clear Communications, Ltd. v. Telecom Corp. of New Zealand, CP590/9 I, slip op. (H.C. Dec. 22,
1992) (available at the Yale Law Library), rev'd, C.A. 25-93, slip op. (C.A. Dec. 17, 1993) (available at
the Yale Law Library).
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Until recently, regulators have often approached the rental-fee decision in
the manner suggested by the following example. Let the direct average-
incremental cost incurred by landlord X as a result of Y's use of its track be
AIC dollars per train. This is the additional cost per train incurred by the
landlord railroad-including track wear and tear, additional planning, and
administrative cost-as a result of the tenant's use of the landlord's tracks.
Suppose that because of economies of scale, total revenues must exceed the
sum of the incremental costs of the two types of traffic if X is to break even.
Suppose further that, in the absence of trackage rights, the traffic from A to C
had yielded X a net contribution toward the shortfall (that is, total incremental
revenue minus incremental cost) of T, and assume that contribution T equals
$90 million per year. Finally, suppose that, after granting trackage rights, X is
expected to retain two-thirds of the traffic from A to C, with the remaining
traffic going to Y,
Assuming freight rates for shipments from A to C are fixed, regulators
generally have determined the proper rental fee for the trackage rights to consist
of (1) a charge per train of railroad Y set equal to the (direct)
average-incremental cost to X of handling Y's train, and (2) a supplement
designed to leave X with exactly two-thirds of the $90 million contribution that
the traffic formerly provided. Under this regulatory rule, in other words, the
landlord is granted its pro rata share of the contribution, in this case
corresponding to its two-thirds expected share of the total traffic. This
regulatory rule, however, violates economic efficiency. As will now be shown,
it fails to compensate railroad X adequately for its common fixed costs; thus,
the rule distorts the efficient division of responsibilities between X and Y in
supplying transport over the competitive segment BC.
C. The Efficient Component-Pricing Principle as a Requirement of Economic
Efficiency: What Is the Efficiency Issue?
The efficient pricing principle for product components is not only required
by the competitive-market standard for defensible behavior by an allegedly
dominant firm. It is also a necessary condition for economic efficiency, and
hence for promoting the public interest. That is, product-component prices that
do not follow this principle create an incentive for inefficiency whose costs
consumers have to pay.
Another example demonstrates the nature of the efficiency issue. Consider
a pharmaceutical manufacturer X that is the sole supplier of a medical
ingredient A on which it holds a patent. The final product may require other
medical ingredients, capsule cases, packaging, and marketing services, all of
which firm X also can provide, although it is not the only enterprise that can
do so. Economic efficiency requires that capsule cases,, packaging, retail
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marketing services, and so on, each be supplied by those firms that can most
efficiently produce the goods and services-that is, by means that minimize the
costs of the labor, fuel, raw materials, and other inputs used in producing the
components. The choice is often interpreted as a make-or-buy decision on the
part of finn X, the supplier of patent-protected component A. Finn X should
make the capsule cases, the packaging, and so on only if it is the most efficient
supplier of these items. Otherwise, public interest dictates that firm X buy those
components from a rival supplier who can provide them more efficiently.
Whether firm X will make the efficient choice voluntarily depends on the
relative price of the competing suppliers of the capsule cases (and the other
product inputs). If their price when offered by a rival supplier is lower than the
cost at which firm X can make capsule cases for itself, X will be motivated to
purchase the cases rather than produce them. Efficiency in pricing requires that
the capsules are priced so that X will find it profitable to select the more
efficient provider to manufacture the capsules. X should supply the capsules
itself if and only if it is the more efficient supplier. In telecommunications
services, the analogous problem is to price access so that the job of carrying
intraLATA traffic goes to the more efficient of the competing carriers.
D. Efficiency of the Component-Pricing Rule and the
Competitive-Market Model
In brief, the optimal component-pricing rule asserts that the rent that tenant
railroad Y should pay per train is the entire average-incremental cost incurred
by each train traversing landlord railroad X's route AB, including any
incremental opportunity cost that the passage of Y's train imposes on X.
Expressed in this way, the rule is entirely familiar to economists, and its logic
will be virtually self-evident to them, except for its focus on average-
incremental cost rather than marginal cost.
The efficiency of this optimal component-pricing rule is confirmed
indirectly by the fact that it yields a price level set in precisely the same way
it would be in a perfectly competitive or a perfectly contestable market. To see
this, imagine a set of landlords competing to rent retail space to tenants.
Suppose further, as is often true, that if no suitable tenant can be found, the
space can be used for the landlord's own profitable retailing establishment. No
landlord who can use the property in this way will rent it to anyone for less
than the direct incremental cost of the tenant's occupation of the property plus
the opportunity cost to the landlord of the rental arrangement. If the landlord
can earn $90,000 by using the property, the tenant will be required to make
good the $90,000 that is forgone by renting the property. The same argument
applies whether the opportunity cost is incurred because landlord and tenant
compete for space or because they compete for customers.
Vol. 11: 171, 1994
Inputs Sold to Competitors
Consequently, even in the most competitive of markets, no landlord will
rent for less than the fee determined under the efficient component-pricing rule.
Moreover, if competition abounds-that is, if a profusion of alternative
properties are available to the tenant on comparable terms-the tenant will pay
no more than the efficient component price. In practice, of course, the tenant
can be expected to spend slightly more than that, in order to induce the landlord
to rent rather than use the property himself.
Since, in the absence of externalities, it is expected that competitive prices
will be consistent with economic efficiency, the preceding argument establishes
a presumption that thecomponent-pricing rule is indeed optimal. This is also
made clear by our railroad example, which will now be used to show how the
optimal input price is calculated.
Recall from Figure 1 that in our illustration only railroad X offers
transportation from A to B (route AB)' and then to C (route BXC). Its
competitor, railroad Y, also offers transportation from B to C (route BYC) and
it wishes to serve shippers from A as well by renting trackage rights along X's
route AB. By obtaining interconnection over route AB, railroad Y will be able
to offer shippers seamless transportation service from A to C, which is our
illustrative final product. Suppose the competitive price to shippers for transport
from A to C is $10 per ton, and X's incremental cost along each of its two
route segments, AB and BXC, is $3 per ton. Thus, on its carriage of shipments
from A to C, landlord X earns a net contribution toward its common fixed costs
equal to the final-product price minus its two incremental costs-that is,
X's earned contribution = $10 - $3 - $3 = $4
for every ton of freight X carries over the full route from A to C.
In a competitive market, what will railroad X charge railroad Y for
permitting the latter to haul a ton of freight over X's route AB? Assume for
simpler exposition that each ton of freight carried from B to C by Y means that
one less ton is transported by X. Then, even if there are other railroads in
positions similar to X, none will rent Y their tracks unless Y pays them enough
to compensate for the cost of the lost profit that Y's interconnection will impose
on them. This cost includes the direct incremental cost-wear and tear of X's
tracks, fuel if X is required to supply the engine, and so on-a sum that we take
to be $3 in our example. But full compensation for interconnection also requires
that Y pay for the incremental opportunity cost its traffic imposes upon X-that
is, the loss of $4 of net contribution toward common fixed costs that X incurs
for every ton of business that Y diverts from X by using X's tracks. Thus, the
competitive-market standard requires that the price of trackage rights (or, more
generally, of interconnection) must also satisfy the efficient component-pricing
rule. In our example, the direct per-unit incremental cost to railroad X of
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permitting use of its route AB is $3 per ton. Railroad X's per-unit opportunity
cost is its loss of $4 per ton of net contribution toward its common fixed costs.
Thus, the efficient component price for granting railroad Y interconnection over
route AB is $7 per ton-the price that would emerge in a competitive market.
E. Direct Discussion of the Role of Component Pricing in
Promoting Efficiency
The component-pricing principle has a critical role in promoting economic
efficiency. Continuing with our railroad example, it will now be demonstrated
that if the price ofthe component provided by landlord railroad X is set
according to this pricing rule, then the two participating railroads will face
incentives that automatically assign the business over route AB to the supplier
who can provide it with the least use of fuel, labor, and other valuable inputs.
But if the rental payment for'the landlord's component-in this case, X's tracks
over route AB-is set at a price below that required by the efficient
component-pricing principle, the requirements of economic efficiency will be
violated. Economic efficiency requires that the competitive segment of the
service be performed only by efficient suppliers-that is, by those suppliers
whose incremental costs incurred to supply the service are the lowest available.
In order to realize this goal, it must be possible for the more efficient suppliers
to make a net profit when they offer the final product for a price that yields
no such gain to less efficient suppliers. This condition must hold whether the
more efficient supplier happens to be the landlord or the tenant.
We first will demonstrate the basic efficiency result using our hypothetical
numerical example, and then we will show how to generalize it, indicating that
the result is valid always, not only when the pertinent numbers happen in reality
to match those in our illustration. First, however, we must recall that even if
every one of a firm's services is sold at a price equal to its average-incremental
cost, the firm's total revenues may not cover its total costs. Consequently, it
is normal and not anticompetitive for a firm to price some or all of its products
to provide not only the required profit component of incremental cost, but also
some contribution toward recovery of common fixed costs that do not enter the
incremental costs of the individual products. The appropriate and viable size
of the contribution of a particular product depends in part upon demand
conditions for that product; the contribution does not follow any standard
markup rule or any arbitrary cost-allocation procedure. Any service whose price
exceeds its per-unit incremental cost provides such a contribution in addition
to the profit required on the incremental investment contained in the
incremental cost.,
With all this in mind, consider again our numerical example encompassing
railroads X and Y. Suppose that the final product in question, transport from
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A to C, is sold to shippers at a price of $10 per ton-a price deemed
competitive and thus above the incremental-cost floor. We have already
assumed that landlord railroad X incurs an incremental cost for transport from
A to B (which we will call ICA) that equals $3 per ton, and an incremental cost
for transport from B to C (which we will call ICBxc) that also equals $3 per ton.
We saw that these incremental costs leave a net contribution toward common
fixed costs of $4 per ton (that is, $10 - $3 - $3) from each unit of final
product sold. We also saw that the efficient component-pricing principle
requires that the landlord railroad X offer interconnection over route AB to
tenant railroad Y at a price equal to ICAB plus X's opportunity cost (that is, $3
+ $4 = $7). At that price, the tenant's gross earnings per unit of final product
amount to $3. This represents the $10 final-product price minus the $7 fee that
the tenant pays to the landlord for interconnection over route AB. But to
determine Y's net earnings we must also subtract from this sum the incremental
cost tenant railroad Y incurs when it transports a ton of freight over its own
route segment to complete the trip from A to C. There are three possibilities:
Case 1: If tenant railroad Y is the less efficient supplier of the
remainder of the final product (transport from B to C), so that its
incremental cost (say, $4) exceeds the $3 incremental cost of landlord
railroad X for transport from B to C, then Y will lose money if it
attempts to provide the final product. Here, the $10 price for the final
product must be exceeded by the $11 sum of the efficient component
price ($7) plus Y's incremental cost of completing the final product
($4). So, Y will be kept out-not by an improper price, but because
of its own inefficiency. This is the outcome required by the public
interest.
Case 11: If the incremental cost of providing transport from B to C
is the same for both railroads ($3), then the two firms are equally
efficient suppliers of transport from B to C. It does not matter to
society which railroad provides the service. Moreover, the tenant will
experience no gain and no loss by providing the service, since its
profit in excess of incremental capital cost = price - trackage fee -
Y's incremental cost over route BC = $10 - $7 - $3 = $0, so that the
tenant, offered only a return equal to its capital cost, will be
indifferent with respect to providing transport.
Case III: In the third case, the tenant is the more efficient supplier
of transport from B to C with an incremental cost of, say, $2. Y can
then undercut slightly X's final-product price ($10) and make an
additional profit for itself while still covering both the efficient
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component price that it must pay to X ($7) and its own incremental
cost 6f completing the final product (which is less than $3). For
example, Y can sell the final product for $9.75 per unit, making a
profit of $0.75 per unit over the cost of capital (that is, $9.75 - $7
- $2). The landlord will have no incentive to retain for itself the
transportation business from B to C. It could do so only by matching
the tenant's $9.75 price. However, at any price below $10 the
landlord would be accepting a contribution less than the contribution
($4) that it can obtain through the efficient component prices it
charges Y for Y's provision of transport from B to C.
In Case III above, the landlord is said to have chosen to "buy" rather than
"make" the B-to-C transportation component of the final product. This result
shows how the efficient component-pricing rule achieves the principle of
indifference. That is, the rule sets the landlord's component price at an amount
which includes all the landlord's costs, so that the landlord is indifferent as to
whether that particular transportation service is provided by itself or a rival,
since all the landlord's costs are-covered one way or the other. The rule thus
ensures that the task of providing transport from B to C is performed by the
firm that can do it more efficiently.
This result will be different if regulation forces the landlord to offer
transport from A to B at a price below the efficient component price. If
regulation permitted X, for example, to charge at most $5.50 for transport from
A to B (rather than the $7 price permitted under the efficient component-pricing
rule), then the tenant's gross earnings-that is, its final-product price ($10)
minus the rental price ($5.50)-would be $4.50, or $1.50 above X's incremental
cost of providing transport from'B to C. Even if Y's incremental cost of
providing transport from B to C were $4, making it a less efficient supplier of
the competitive transportation service than X, Y could still enter the arena and
earn a contribution from its inefficient activity, for its per-unit profit would then
be $10 - $5.50 - $4 = $0.50. The less efficient supplier is able to earn this
profit because the imposition of the $5.50 price offers the tenant a subsidy from
the landlord of $1.50 for every unit of service the tenant elects to provide.
Moreover, that subsidy is, in effect, obtainable by the tenant on demand,
because the $5.50 price is imposed by regulatory authority.
The connection between the efficient component-pricing rule and allocative
efficiency should now be clear: the rule ensures proper pricing and efficiency
in the competitive segment of the rail route, just as it will ensure this outcome
in the local telecommunications loop. It only remains to be shown that the
efficiency result is not unique to the numbers we happened to select for our
illustration, but rather has general applicability. To demonstrate this, we now
substitute algebraic symbols for the preceding numbers.
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F. Formal Discussion of the Rule's Efficiency
The formal discussion that follows proves the general efficiency of the
component-pricing rule and provides additional insight into its workings. In
algebraic terms, the rule indicates that the appropriate per-train payment by the
tenant railroad Y (the purchaser of access) is AIC, the per-unit incremental cost
(excluding opportunity cost), plus TIM, where T is the total contribution to
common fixed costs that X earned from the traffic over route AC before
granting trackage rights, and M is the total number of trains of both railroads
together going from A to C. First, we prove that pricing according to the rule
leaves the landlord indifferent between granting the trackage rights to the tenant
and using the tracks for itself. Under the rule, the landlord railroad X will
receive from Y, for Y's traffic consisting of N trains, a total payment equal to
(N)(AIC) + NTIM. (1)
This gives X a contribution to profit equal to
(N)(AIC) + NT/M - the cost to X of Y's traffic over AB =
(N)(AIC) + NTIM - (N)(AIC) = NTIM. (2)
NTIM is the contribution X receives from Y's traffic. The contribution that X
will receive from the (M - N) trains of its own that continue to traverse the
route after the grant of trackage rights will equal the number of its trains, (M
- N), multiplied by the contribution per train
(M - N) TIM = T - NTIM. (3)
Therefore, the landlord's gain from the combined traffic, after expending
(N)(AIC) on Y's trains in the manner expressed in Equation (2), will be the sum
of the contribution from Y's traffic given by Equation (2) and the contribution
from its own traffic, Equation (3). That is,
(NTIM) + T - NT/M = T. (4)
In other words, under the optimal component-pricing rule, the landlord will gain
the same total contribution T whether or not it grants the traffic rights, and
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despite the fact that the landlord now operates fewer trains of its own.12 This
outcome differs from the traditional regulatory arrangement, which assigns both
X and Y a share of T prorated in proportion to their respective shares, (M - N)
and N, of the total traffic M.
We now see how this result relates to the issue of efficiency. Let AICX or
AIC, be the per-train incremental cost if this competitive B-to-C portion of the
transportation service is performed by X or Y, respectively. Then it will be more
efficient for landlord railroad X to transport the freight if AICx < AlCy, and it
will be more efficient for tenant railroad Y to do so if the inequality is
reversed."3
To prove that the component-pricing rule automatically apportions the task
to the more efficient carrier, we first provide an explicit expression for the
contribution T of the total traffic over route AC. For this purpose, let P
represent the price that shippers pay to transport a trainload of freight over the
entire route AC. Then, in the absence of its grant of trackage rights to Y, X
obtains from its train traffic M the following contribution
T = M(P - AIC - AICx), (5)
where AIC is, as before, the incremental cost of taking a train over the
noncompetitive route segment AB, and A1Cx is X's incremental cost of carrying
the train the remainder of route BXC. Now, if Y acquires trackage rights and
sends 'N trains from A to C, Y will earn a profit equal to its total revenue PN,
minus its optimal input-price payment given by Equation (1), minus (N)(AIC,),
the incremental cost incurred by carrying the N trains over its own route BYC.
That is,
Y's profit = N(P - AIC - TIM - AIC,), (6)
12. The efficient component-pricing rule may appear, therefore, to conflict with the result contributed
by Peter Diamond and John Mirrlees, who assert that in a Ramsey solution it is inefficient for the price of
any intermediate good to include any markup over marginal cost. Peter A. Diamond & John A. Mirrlees,
Optimal Taxation and Public Productiot, I1: Tax Rules, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 261 (1971). There is no such
conflict here, however, since true marginal cost must include all of the (social) marginal opportunity cost.
The contribution derived from the tenant by the landlord is simply part of the landlord's opportunity cost
incurred in providing trackage space to the tenant; the contribution entails no Ramsey markup over that
marginal cost. It should be noted, incidentally, that as is usual in discussions of Ramsey analysis, Diamond
and Mirrlees do not consider cases of scale economies, so that the allocation of production among firms
entails an interior maximum in the determination of which MC rather than AIC plays the key cost role.
13. It is easy to extend the analysis to the case where efficiency requires each railroad to carry part
of the traffic, apportioned so that MC, = MC r, where MC x is the marginal cost to railroad X of carrying
an additional unit (carload or ton) of freight over route segment BC.
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or, substituting the value of TIM obtainable from Equation (5),
Y's profit = N(P - AIC - P + AIC + AICx - AIC,)
= N(AICx - AICy). (7)
Thus, Y will profit by renting the trackage rights from X if and only if Y is the
more efficient carrier, AlCy < AlC x.Indeed, Y's profit will then equal the net
resources that society saves by use of Y rather than X. Equation (7) also shows
that, when the pricing of the trackage rights follows the efficient
component-pricing rule, Y will lose money by acquiring those rights if it is the
less efficient carrier. In sum, the rent-setting rule presented in Equation (1)
optimally allocates the traffic between X and y.14 The same logic applies
without modification to the pricing of access to the local telecommunications
loop.
IV. The Efficient Component-Pricing Rule Applied to Telecommunications
The efficient component-pricing rule is applicable to a number of current
and prospective regulatory and antitrust controversies in telecommunications.
We now discuss some generic problems that are likely to be encountered in
applying the rule to telecommunications situations, and we examine several
specific cases in which the rule has been or is likely to be applied. Many of
these problems were confronted in the pathbreaking antitrust case, Clear
Communications, Ltd. v. Telecom Corporation of New Zealand, Ltd.'- We
believe the New Zealand experience will have considerable relevance to the
American telecommunications arena as head-to-head competition between local
exchange carriers emerges, particularly following the merger of Bell Atlantic
and TCI. We therefore begin with a discussion of the New Zealand telecom-
munications arena.
14. Those who consider it inequitable for the landlord to be paid the full opportunity cost of its rental
have referred to such pricing as a "perfect price squeeze." See, e.g., WILLIAM B. TYE, THE THEORY OF
CONTESTABLE MARKETS: APPLICATIONS TO REGULATORY AND ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN THE RAIL
INDUSTRY 65-69 (1990). Equation (7) shows, however, that the efficient component-pricing rule gives the
tenant all the fruits of whatever superiority in efficiency it may provide.
15. Clear Communications, Ltd. v. Telecom Corp. of New Zealand, CP590/91, slip op. (H.C. Dec. 22,
1992) (available at the Yale Law Library) Ihereinafter Clear v. Telecom), rev'd, C.A. 25-93, slip op. (C.A.
Dec. 17, 1993) (available at the Yale Law Library). For an insightful discussion of the case written by
Telecom's barrister in the litigation, see James Farmer, Transformation from Protected Monopoly to
Competition: The New Zealand Experiment, I COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 1 (1993).
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A. Competition in Local Telephony in New Zealand
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (Telecom) is the privatized
descendant of the former telecommunications branch of the New Zealand Post
Office. In September 1990, the New Zealand government sold Telecom to a
consortium that included two American RBOCs, Bell Atlantic and
Ameritech. 6 Unlike the American telephone market, where the RBOCs
provide local exchange services but are prohibited from providing interLATA
long-distance services, New Zealand has adopted no such restrictions. Telecom
provides both local exchange and interexchange service throughout New
Zealand. Until April 1, 1989, Telecom enjoyed a statutory monopoly in the
provision of telecommunication network services. Since then, all telecommuni-
cations markets in New Zealand have been open to competition. 7 Telecom,
however, still remains subject to certain regulations.
Telecom's articles of association provide for one "Kiwi Share," which is
held by the Minister of Finance on behalf of the Crown.'" The Kiwi Share
creates a contract between the Kiwi Shareholder and Telecom whereby the
latter is obligated to provide residential telephone service on specified
(subsidized) terms, subject to the constraint that Telecom achieve overall
profitability. 9 This duty to subsidize residential service is known as the Kiwi
Share Obligation, or KSO. Under this subsidy arrangement, Telecom may not
impose per-call charges on residential subscribers or increase their basic rental
fee faster than increases in the cost-of-living index.2"
In August 1990, a new company, later renamed Clear Communications,
Ltd. (Clear), was formed to compete against Telecom. Clear was also a joint
venture between New Zealand investors and two formidable telecommunications
firms from North America-MCI Communications Corporation and BCE
Incorporated, the holding company for the Bell Canada Group.2' By October
1990, Clear had secured the requisite order under New Zealand law recognizing
the firm as a network operator entitled to negotiate for interconnection to the
public switching telecommunications network (PSTN) owned by Telecom.
Clear made impressive inroads against Telecom, capturing more than ten
percent of toll revenues in New Zealand in less than eighteen months.22 Clear
began by offering bypass of toll services provided by Telecom. Soon after, it
16. Clear v. Telecom, slip op. at 4.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 26-27.
19. Id. at 27-28.
20. Farmer, supra note 15, at 16.
21. Clear v. Telecom, slip op. at 4-5. As part of the subsequent agreement between MCI and British
Telecom (BT) to form a global strategic alliance, MCI sold its stake in Clear to BT. See Grahame Lynch,
MCI to Sell Clear Stake to BT in Global Alliance Deal, EXCHANGE, June 18, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Allnews Library, ZPCI file.
22. Farmer, supra note 15, at 16.
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began to compete in the provision of local telephone service to business
customers in New Zealand's largest cities-Auckland, Wellington, and
Christchurch. 3 Unlike Telecom, however, Clear did not have a Kiwi Share
Obligation to provide subsidized residential service. A dispute then arose over
whether the interconnection fee that Telecom proposed to charge Clear should
include a contribution to Telecom's cost of providing this residential subsidy.
When Clear's negotiations with Telecom to interconnect Clear's proposed
"Gateway" service to the PSTN broke down, Clear sued Telecom under New
Zealand's antitrust statute, section 36 of the Commerce Act of 1986.' Clear
argued that Telecom had violated section 36 in three principal respects: (1) by
taking five months to respond to Clear's interconnection proposal; (2) by
requiring anyone calling a Clear Gateway subscriber from the PSTN first to
dial a three-digit access code, "023," which would not be necessary to call
Telecom subscribers; and, most importantly in the view of the trial court, (3)
by "charging too much for interconnection. 25
The trial judge, Judge Ellis of the Wellington Registry of the High Court
of New Zealand, recognized that the case presented an issue of first impression.
How should access prices be set among overlapping local exchange carriers?
The question had simply not arisen in the modem experience of telecommuni-
cations regulation because either technology or government monopoly had
always precluded competition in local telephony. Judge Ellis wrote:
The history of the negotiations and this dispute we will soon
relate shows the polarisation of the parties on matters of economic
principle. There are no guidelines for the parties provided by
legislation or regulation. The mechanisms of negotiation have failed
and only the strictures of the Commerce Act can advance the matter.
After the parties reached deadlock in August 1991, Telecom decided
to seek assistance from overseas economists with experience in the
field where dominant firms are obliged to make their facilities
available to would be competitors. However-there were no identical
situations that have exposed solutions. This is the first time that such
23. Clear v. Telecom, slip op. at 6.
24. Id . Section 36(l) of the Commerce Act provides:
No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that position for the purpose of
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or (b) Preventing or
deterring any person-from engaging in competitive conduct in that or in any other market; or
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market.
Commerce Act, 196, No. 5, § 36, 1986 N.Z. Stat. 71, 95.
25. Clear v. Telecom, slip op. at 8-9.
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a problem has fallen to be determined by a Court governed only by
the general provisions of a competition statute.26
Much of the complexity of the pricing problem derived from the reciprocal
need for access to the facilities of each firm in a network industry:
In order to be able to offer a local service Clear needs to
provide line access for each customer to its own switch, and a trunk
from that to Telecom's switches. It needs to give customers the ability
to make and receive calls not only within its own network but also
to and from Telecom's PSTN. Clear must have an ubiquitous service,
just as Telecom has now. Indeed once Clear has interconnected,
Telecom will need access to Clear's network for it to continue to
provide a ubiquitous service.27
To effect this intercofinection, Clear proposed "first that there would be no
number access code to get into or out of the two networks and second there
would be no charge by either for access to the other's network, except to
balance the volume of calls."2 Telecom objected to this proposal, and Clear
and Telecom's months of negotiations over mutually agreeable terms proved
fruitless. Telecom then retained economists, including one of the authors, to
recommend an efficient pricing regime. On the basis of those recommendations,
Telecom's final offer to Clear and Clear's response to it, as summarized by
Judge Ellis, were the following:
Telecom now accepts that:
(1) As regards the access charge, Telecom will be
entitled to the equivalent of a monthly line rental at
business rates less any saving in its average incremental
cost because Clear puts in the equivalent of the loop to
Telecom's switch. This is known as the access levy which
is foregone;
(2) As regards the traffic charge, in respect of a call into
the Clear network, it claims to be entitled to be paid that
part of Telecom's cost saved by Clear carrying the call
.part of the way. Conversely it is entitled to charge Clear
for the whole of calls entering the Telecom network at its
26. Id. at 10- 11.
27. Id. at 13.
28. Id. at 30.
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business rates less that part of Telecom's cost saved by
Clear carrying the call part of the way.
(3) Telecom claims that Clear should meet the cost of
the link constructed by Telecom between ihe Clear and the
Telecom switches ("the bridge") at Telecom's incremental
cost.
Telecom accepts the necessary periodic adjustments. It
accepts that when Clear's local network is "big enough"
there will be reciprocity in the access levy to each
competitor's network.
This is intended to be an application of the Baumol-Willig
model [for efficient component-pricing] .... Clear does not accept
the model but we understand agrees with the consequences of its
adoption. Clear's final position is that there should be no access levy;
the KSO [to provide subsidized residential service] should be borne
by Telecom alone; the cost of the bridge should be shared equally;
and there should be either a free exchange of calls or alternatively a
settlements regime.29
The above statement reflects the parties' final positions when Judge Ellis
considered whether Telecom's behavior constituted an anticompetitive use of
a dominant market position.
After a lengthy analysis of the efficient component-pricing rule and Clear's
criticisms lodged against it, Judge Ellis embraced the rule as the appropriate
legal standard to guide the pricing obligations imposed on a monopolist that
sells inputs to competitors. He wrote that "failure to use a pricing rule that
charges for access to Telecom's network, that charges for the incremental cost
imposed on Telecom, that shares the KSO would ... foster the development
of uneconomic bypass and the proliferation of uneconomic operators."3 He
elaborated:
In the end it is our judgment that implementation of the Rule
is more likely than the alternative to improve efficient competition
in New Zealand telecommunications. In that case, Telecom cannot be
said to be using its position of dominance for the purpose of
preventing or deterring Clear from engaging in competitive conduct
29. Id. at 49-50. Professor Robert D. Willig was co-author, with one of the authors, of the economists'
affidavit mentioned by Judge Ellis. Dr. Alfred E. Kahn submitted complementary expert testimony describing
the "principle of competitive parity." Id. at 69-70.
30. Id. at 95.
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in the New Zealand telecommunications market. If the defendant's
conduct is more likely than not, in light of the available alternatives,
to improve competition, the defendant cannot be said to be in breach
of the purpose requirements of [section] 36. There is an improvement
in competition when there is an enhancement of an efficient competi-
tive process.
Consequently, Judge Ellis held that "Telecom was up until its final stance at
trial in breach of [section] 36 in that it asked too much for connection to the
local loop." Having concluded this, the New Zealand court accepted the
efficient component-pricing rule as the correct antitrust standard for assessing
the legality of the pricing of inputs sold to competitors.32
The Court of Appeal of New Zealand, however, reversed the judgment of
the High Court on the grounds that it would violate section 36 of the
Commerce Act for Telecom to include its forgone monopoly profit in the
opportunity-cost component of the access charge paid by Clear. Justice Gault
of the Court of Appeals wrote:
The reason I have rejected the opportunity cost method of
pricing in the circumstances of this case is that it does not exclude
monopoly profits. That reason does not dictate that no access charge
could be levied to recover a contribution to the claimed cross-subsidy
[for residential customers] or otherwise to contribute to the fixed costs
of the Telecom network.33
This conclusion is placed in context when read alongside the observation of
Justice Cooke in his concurring opinion:
It is important, I think, to appreciate that the theory [of efficient
component pricing] has been developed primarily for a country of
regulated markets where prices for ultimate consumers may be
controlled by regulatory agencies. That is not the present situation in
New Zealand: the system is one of "light-handed" regulation, the
Commerce Act and competition being relied upon to provide built-in
safeguards against consumer exploitation.34
31. Id. at 95-96.
32. Id. at 100.
33. Clear Communications, Ltd. v. Telecom Corp. of New Zealand, C.A. 25-93, slip op. at 42 (C.A.
Dec. 17, 1993) (Gault, J.).
34. Id. at 4 (Cooke, J.).
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Given these circumstances, we must sympathize with the reasoning of the Court
of Appeal. As we explain elsewhere, the efficient component-pricing rule plays
its full beneficial role only when adopted as part of a set of complementary
rules designed to promote consumer welfare.3 One such rule is that a
monopolist should not be permitted to charge a price for a final product sold
to consumers that is higher than the price that would attract an efficient entrant
into that market-a price equal to the stand-alone cost of producing that final
product.36 But, as Justice Cooke noted, no such price ceiling exists under the
current laws and regulations of New Zealand. It is therefore understandable that
the Court of Appeal ordered Clear and Telecom to renew negotiations to set
an access price that excluded any monopoly profit forgone by Telecom.
The input-pricing problem addressed in Clear v. Telecom is likely to arise
in the United States in a number of telecommunications situations. The
intraLATA market is one arena that we have already mentioned. Another is the
local exchange itself, access to which will be sought by competing access
providers and even overlapping local exchange carriers (fashioned perhaps from
cable television systems, as the failed merger of Bell Atlantic and TCI would
have done). The program-access provisions of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which require vertically integrated
cable operators to make programming available on a nondiscriminatory basis
to other multichannel video distributors, also invite use of the efficient-
component pricing. rule.37
B. Controversial Components of Opportunity Cost
1. Loss of Monopoly Markup
The decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand illustrates a frequent
objection to the efficient component-pricing rule. The complaint is that the rule
is a means of ensuring that the landlord can continue receiving any monopoly
profits it has been able to earn on the final product. Suppose that, in the
absence of the tenant, the landlord has monopoly power in the final-product
market and earns a high rate of profit on sales. If, by supplying the input to
the tenant, the landlord permits the tenant to take away some of those profitable
sales, then the monopoly profit on those forgone final-product sales is indeed
an opportunity cost to the landlord. According to the efficient component-
pricing rule, the tenant should be required to compensate the landlord for that
35. BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 8, at 140-41.
36. Id. at 77-85.
37. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 19, 106 Stat. 1460, 1494-97 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 54H); see also
Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, First Report and Order, MM Dkt. No. 92-265, 8 F.C.C. Rec. 3359 (1993).
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loss. This ensures the monopoly earnings of the landlord. It also undercuts the
tenant's power to introduce effective competition into the final-product market
and, thereby, its ability to reduce prices to their competitive levels.
All this is true, but the villain is not the efficient component-pricing rule.
The real problem is that the landlord has been permitted to charge monopoly
prices for the final product in the first place. Had the ceiling upon final-product
prices been based on stand-alone cost, which as we explain elsewhere it should
be,38 the landlord could never have earned a monopoly profit in this regulatory
scenario. The error, therefore, is the failure to impose the stand-alone cost
ceiling on the final-product price, not the use of the efficient component-pricing
rule.
2. Special-Service Obligations
A related issue arises when a regulated firm has special-service obligations
imposed upon it. Examples include arrangements in which the input supplier
is also forced to serve as the "carrier of last resort," or when, as in the case of
Clear v. Telecom, the carrier is required to supply services to residential
customers at rates that it claims to be insufficient to cover the pertinent
incremental costs. These obligations are appropriately treated as sources of
common fixed costs for the firm; the costs must be covered legitimately by the
firm's prices and be taken into account in calculating its stand-alone cost
ceilings.
In such a situation, the hypothetical entrant, whose costs constitute the
stand-alone cost ceiling, should have imposed upon it the same special-service
obligations as those borne by the incumbent. To do otherwise is to condemn
the regulated firm to operating losses. In any competitive market equilibrium
where costs are imposed by fiat upon all firms and prospective entrants, prices
will have to cover those costs in addition to any other costs of the efficient
suppliers. In that case, the opportunity cost of supplying an input to a
competitor must also include any forgone contribution to coverage of the costs
of special-service obligations imposed by regulators. If those costs are imposed
on only one firm, with current rivals and entrants exempted, a special handicap
is clearly borne by that firm and competition will prevent it from recovering
those costs.
38. BALIMOL & SIDAK, supra note 8, at 77-85.
Vol. 11: 171, 1994
Inputs Sold to Competitors
C. Network Externalities and Demand Complementarities
The preceding discussion should not be interpreted to imply that when
access provided by an LEC to an IXC leads to the sale of an additional X
message minutes of business by the IXC along a given intraLATA route, the
result will necessarily be an equal loss of business by the LEC. For simplicity
of exposition, we have used in the preceding text the case of the zero-sum
game-whatever business an entrant gains is business lost by the incumbent.
In practice, markets do not necessarily work that way. Entrants are known to
beat the bushes for customers who were not previous users of the product in
question. Moreover, there is evidence indicating that the two-way nature of tele-
communications produces a beneficial network externality: an individual
consumer's demand for use of the network increases with the number of other
users on the network. 39 Thus, if the entrant brings in some new customers,
it can also stimulate additional demand for the incumbent's services. In addition
to the network externalities, the LEC's supply of access to a competitor might
stimulate demand for the LEC's final product if there is complementarity of
the two demands associated with the volume of traffic. For example, more
household traffic can stimulate business telephone usage.4°
Thus, an entering IXC is likely to devote effort to expanding the market,
using the access to serve at least some new business that entails no reduction
in LEC volume, and may even bring a bit of additional traffic to the LEC. In
that case, the pertinent opportunity cost to the LEC of the supply of access will
be lower than if the added IXC volume is added directly and fully at the
expense of LEC sales. The pertinent opportunity cost figure is the contribution
actually forgone by the LEC, not the contribution it would have lost if all of
the IXC's gain had come at the LEC's expense.
D. Explicit Access Charges to the IXC and Implicit Access Charges
of the LEC to Itself
The efficient component-pricing rule has two important applications to the
regulation of local telephone service. First, it tells us what price is appropriate
for the LEC to charge the IXCs for access service. More generally, it indicates
39. See, e.g., BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 11 (1991); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 405 (198M). Usually,
we think of the network externality in telecommunications accruing when another access line or another
node (exchange) is added to the network. "When a new node is added, the externality is reflected in the
number of calls made between any existing nodes and the new node (not an increase in the calls between
existing nodes)." MITCHELL & VOGELSANG, supra, at 11.
40. For a thorough theoretical and empirical discussion of such complementarity effects in telecom-
munications demand, see LESTER D. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
23-24, 221-40 (1994).
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the price that any other competitor of the LEC should pay to obtain access to
the local loop. Second, the analysis underlying the rule indicates how the LEC
should price the final product, intraLATA toll service, when selling that product
to consumers. As we see next, the LEC's production of that service also entails
an opportunity cost for itself. Hence, the price of that final product must at least
equal its average-incremental cost, including the pertinent opportunity cost.
The opportunity cost to the LEC of the LEC's own final-product sales is
determined by the price the LEC charges IXCs for access-a price governed
by the efficient component-pricing rule. The LEC, in effect, must choose
between supplying access to the final consumer directly or selling the access
to an IXC, which would provide the'final product-intraLATA toll service-to
that same consumer. Either action requires that the other sale be forgone. The
sale of the final product by the LEC to a telecommunications consumer enables
the LEC to supply the final product-but it could otherwise have been provided
by an IXC, which would have had to purchase access service from the LEC.
Thus, the sale of the final product by the LEC entails a forgone access profit.
The magnitude of this forgone profit, or opportunity cost, is determined by the
price of the sale of access to the IXC,' as governed by the efficient
component-pricing rule. But, we have proved earlier in this Essay that when
the access price follows the efficient component-pricing rule, the LEC must
receive exactly the same profit, whether it uses the access service itself or sells
it to an IXC. That is the parity principle that enables the more efficient supplier
to win out.
The objective of the efficient component-pricing rule is, as the commonly
used clich6 describes, to ensure a "level playing field" for the competitive
efforts of the IXCs and the LEC. When access, priced by the rule, is used by
either an LEC or an IXC to provide the final product to consumers, it will still
be possible for one of the suppliers to undercut the final-product price of the
other, but only if that supplier is the more efficient provider. This is because
the more efficient supplier will incur lower direct incremental costs, even
though its final-product prices are not allowed to contribute less profit to the
supply of access. By ensuring that the implicit price of access by the LEC to
itself and the explicit price to the IXC are the same, the playing field in the sale
of final-product telecommunications services is truly level.
Use of the optimal component-pricing rule has sometimes been complicat-
ed in practice. Institutional arrangements can create an artificial asymmetry
between the contribution forgone by the supplier of the inputs when it sacrifices
sales of the final product and the contribution forgone when it sacrifices sales
of the input for the final product. In one case, the local telephone company is
constrained, by a combination of past practice and regulation, to use one set
of facilities, A, in supplying access to the interexchange carriers, and another
set of facilities, B, in supplying interconnection for its own toll calls into the
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local loop. Under current pricing arrangements, the LEC receives a larger
contribution from a message using B than from one employing A. Consequently,
the opportunity cost when the LEC provides interconnection to itself instead
of an IXC is different from the opportunity cost incurred when the LEC
supplies interconnection to the IXC rather than itself. In this case, the supply
of interconnection for an IXC call, which is presumed to deprive the local
exchange carrier of the final-product business, entails a larger opportunity cost
than does the opposite process-namely, the use of the facilities by the LEC
to provide the final product to its own customers.
The danger with asymmetries of opportunity costs is that the LEC may
try to bias market conditions in its own favor, charging the IXC more for
interconnection to the local loop than it implicitly charges itself for the same
service. The problem lies not in recognizing the appropriate role of opportunity
cost in pricing, but in developing a pricing arrangement that yields different
profits to two different processes for supplying the same service. Clearly, that
outcome violates the dictates of the competitive-market standard, which would
soon bring profits from the use of the A access facilities into line with those
from the B interconnection facilities. In a fully competitive market, either entry
would quickly erode the profits from the more lucrative facilities toward the
level of profits offered by the other facilities, or the less profitable facilities
would soon be abandoned.
Thus, where this situation of asymmetric opportunity costs arises, the
regulator should require, or at least provide, strong incentives for equalization
of the contributions offered by the two sets of facilities. This problem is no
reason to abandon the efficient component-pricing rule or to acquiesce to
biasing input pricing in favor of one party.
E. Marginal and Inframarginal Opportunity Cost
Opportunity costs can involve subtle but important technical complications
in certain situations. For instance, total opportunity costs, even though
substantial, can be close to zero at the margin. However, in other instances, the
marginal opportunity cost of the sale or lease of some good or service can
clearly be positive if the item is limited in supply or entails some fixed
capacity, so that the more the seller supplies to others, the less it has available
for its own use.
A firm that lets others use a bridge whose capacity was already fully
employed to transport its own products obviously is apt to incur an opportunity
cost even when it permits just one additional person to cross. But if an LEC
can easily expand the facilities it uses to provide access, then its sale of access
to others is not affected by any such capacity limitation. In general, if a product
supplier can expand capacity and is prepared to do so until the marginal profit
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of further additions to capacity is zero, then no corresponding marginal
opportunity cost in the sale of the product will arise from a resulting
unavailability of capacity to the seller.
The same can be true of an opportunity cost that arises when the recipient
of access (or some other input) uses it to take profitable business away from
the input supplier. If a firm is a profit-maximizer, then each of its activities will
be carried to the point where it yields zero economic profit at the margin. Thus,
the opportunity cost of losing the marginal unit of any product of one of its
activities can be expected to disappear. This observation has been used to argue
that while price floors for final products as well as the optimal input prices
should all include opportunity costs, if any, in practice this can often be ignored
because marginal opportunity costs are frequently zero.
This argument is misleading, however, because it fails to consider the
pertinent margin. If the price of access is set so low that an IXC can take away
a high proportion of the sales of intraLATA long-distance service by the LEC,
then much more than the zero-profit marginal unit of the LEC's original sales
volume will be lost. That is, the IXC is virtually certain to wrest away a
substantial increment of the LEC's business, not just a single marginal unit.
Then, the remaining business will likely entail more than a zero marginal profit,
because output will have been cut from' the precompetition profit-maximizing
level. Hence, a substantial opportunity cost can be borne by the LEC on the
margin if, having permitted substantial incursions into its business by an IXC,
it permits the IXC to sell still another unit of the product at the new output
level.
Scale economies present yet another reason why the opportunity cost
incurred by supplying access to a rival cannot be ignored. These costs can
substantially affect the efficient price for use of that input. As has been shown,
where production of the particular commodity is characterized by scale
economies, average-incremental cost replaces marginal cost as the pertinent
standard for final-product prices consistent with efficiency in production.
Efficiency in production then requires that where the product is characterized
by declining average-incremental cost, the price must be set no lower than
average-incremental cost.
The role of average-incremental cost in regulating the price of a homoge-
neous service is pertinent to the issue just discussed-the role of opportunity
cost in determining the efficient price. We have just noted that sometimes,
particularly when opportunity cost is not created by capacity limitations,
marginal opportunity cost can be driven to zero. This is possible when the
supplier of the facility can expand capacity to the point that enables him to use
as much as he wants for his own purposes and to sell or lease as much capacity
to others as he desires. But in such a case, even though marginal opportunity
cost may be zero because capacity will be expanded by a profit-maximizing
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firm to the point where the enterprise gains nothing by adding yet another unit,
it does not follow that the opportunity cost on inframarginal units of capacity
will also be zero. If inframarginal units do yield positive benefits to the owner
when used for his own purposes, and if some substantial proportion of that
capacity is nevertheless rented or sold to someone else, then that transaction
will clearly entail a nonzero opportunity cost-the sum of the forgone
inframarginal benefits. That is, the average-incremental opportunity cost will
be positive; the efficient price, which should at least equal AIC, must cover the
nonzero opportunity-cost component as well.
F. Entry by Efficient Rivals
A final word is necessary on the pertinence of the efficient component-
pricing rule to the opportunity for entry. In a competitive market, an incumbent
will levy an access charge on a new entrant that will cover both the direct
incremental cost of providing the access and its opportunity cost. As we have
seen, the latter represents the contribution of the access-using service either
toward meeting a shortfall in the price of another service or toward recovery
of the common fixed costs of supplying some or all of the incumbent's services.
An access charge large enough for these purposes may at first glance seem to
constitute an inappropriate competitive disadvantage to the entrant, since it
requires the entrant to make such a contribution even though the incumbent
may not be performing these activities efficiently, and the entrant itself may
have to undertake similar activities to support its own services. Closer
inspection, however, confirms that these impressions are mistaken.
As has been shown, the efficient component-pricing rule offers the prospect
of success to entrants who can add efficiency to the supply of the final product,
while it ensures that inefficient entrants are not made profitable by an implicit
cross-subsidy extracted from the incumbent. An entrant may have to replicate
some of the incumbent's activities or facilities, and the costs of such duplication
can render an entrant unprofitable. But if that is the case under efficient
component-pricing, then the requisite replication of costs correspondingly
renders the entry inefficient and, ultimately, harmful to consumers and to
society. This is exactly what occurs in an ideally competitive or contestable
market. After all, one of the chief benefits of competitive markets is their
intolerance of inefficient supply arrangements. Input pricing that discourages
inefficient entry cannot be said to constitute an undue competitive disadvantage,
any more than the efficient workings of competitive markets can be labeled
anticompetitive, even if they lead to the demise of less efficient firms.
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Conclusion
As technological innovation and regulatory reform cause entry barriers to
fall in the telecommunications industry, competing firms are seeking to
interconnect to the telecommunications network at a greater number of locations
than in the past. At each such interconnection, an access price will have to be
determined. To borrow a current metaphor, the challenge for public policy is
to set the socially optimal toll for any given on-ramp or interchange along the
interstate highway system. Furthermore, because the telecommunications
network-unlike the interstate highway system-is unlikely to be publicly
owned, regulators must ensure that access prices enable the incumbent firm to
remain financially solvent. The price of access, in other words, must cover not
only the' incumbent's incremental cost of providing access, but also the
opportunity cost that such provision of access implies for the incumbent's
ability to cover its common fixed costs, including its regulatory obligations to
provide universal service. We have proposed here a solution for the regulators
and legislators who have just begun to confront these questions.
In this Essay, we have described the efficient component-pricing rule for
the pricing of access or any other input used both by the input producer and
by competitors in supplying final products. Using a railroad analogy, we
showed how the optimal rental fee for access to a monopolist's tracks is the
sum of the direct incremental cost of permitting the tenant railroad to use the
tracks and the opportunity cost to the landlord railroad of supplying this
downstream competitor with access to those tracks. The trackage-rights problem
is perfectly analogous to the LEC's supply of access to IXCs, and to myriad
situations in network industries in which one firm produces an intermediate
good-access to the network-that constitutes a necessary input for its
competitors in the market for the final product sold to consumers.
The efficient component-pricing rule is applicable generally. The rule
always assigns the supplier's task to the firm that can do it most efficiently.
A price lower than one set in accordance with the rule-as seems often to have
happened under regulatory decisions on the division of profit between the input
producer and the final-product supplier-always constitutes an interfirm
cross-subsidy and so invites the assumption of the supplier's role by a firm that
is not the most efficient provider. This result should not come as a surprise.
It is well known that economic forces set component prices in competitive
markets in this way, and competitive market prices are generally those
necessary to achieve economic efficiency. Thus, our efficiency result also
follows immediately through this indirect route, using the competitive-market
standard as the guide to efficient pricing.
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